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This paper looks at the case of Myanmar in order to investigate the behavior and welfare of 
rural households in an economy under transition from a planned to a market system. Myanmar's 
case is particularly interesting because of the country's unique attempt to preserve a policy of 
intervention in land transactions and marketing institutions. A sample household survey that we 
conducted in 2001, covering more than 500 households in eight villages with diverse 
agro-ecological environments, revealed two paradoxes. First, income levels are higher in 
villages far from the center than in villages located in regions under the tight control of the 
central authorities. Second, farmers and villages that emphasize a paddy-based, irrigated 
cropping system have lower farming incomes than those that do not. The reason for these 
paradoxes are the distortions created by agricultural policies that restrict land use and the 
marketing of agricultural produce. Because of these distortions, the transition to a market 
economy in Myanmar since the late 1980s is only a partial one. The partial transition, which 
initially led to an increase in output and income from agriculture, revealed its limit in the survey 
period.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of income disparities across 
regions and among households in rural Myanmar (formerly Burma). Based on a primary dataset 
collected from eight agro-ecological regions in 2001, we show two paradoxes. First, the income 
level is higher in villages far from the center than in villages located in regions that are tightly 
controlled by the central authorities. This is mainly due to the disparity in the development of 
commercial agriculture and the availability of non-agricultural employment opportunities. In 
most developing countries, commercial agriculture and non-agricultural activities prosper in 
regions close to urban centers, not in peripheral regions. The situation is reversed in Myanmar. 
Second, farmers and villages that emphasize a paddy-based, irrigated cropping system have 
lower farming incomes than those that do not. This is in sharp contrast to the experience of 
other Asian countries where irrigation investment in agriculture contributed to rapid 
improvements in land productivity and farmers' income (Jimenez 1995). The two paradoxes 
can be summarized as "rich periphery, poor center."
1 
The cause for these paradoxes, as we will show, are the distortions created by 
agricultural policies. Myanmar is in a partial transition from a planned to a market economy. 
Market incentives were first introduced during the late 1980s, initially leading to a substantial 
increase in agricultural production and farming incomes. Yet, a number of discretionary 
                                                  
1 It is possible that similar phenomena can be found in other transition economies in Asia, such as China and 
Vietnam. For example, alone among Asian countries, these two successfully introduced hybrid rice, but this 
success is partly attributable to the fact that their governments ignored the profitability of hybrid rice relative to 
non-hybrid varieties (Janaiah and Hossain 2003). If the government forced farmers to adopt non-profitable 
varieties, the income of farmers located in the center is likely to have been lower than that of farmers located in the 
periphery. Although a full comparison of China and Vietnam with Myanmar is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
conjecture that before the transition started in China and Vietnam a situation quite similar to the one in Myanmar, 
including the two paradoxes found in this paper, prevailed. Rozelle et al. (1999), for example, showed that living 
conditions in China were higher in the center than in the periphery, while Huang and Rozelle (2002) showed that 
irrigation led to higher incomes of villagers in China during the 1990s. Therefore, the current case of Myanmar is 
worth examining.    3
measures, especially relating to land transactions and marketing institutions for paddy/rice,
2 
were maintained.  
Myanmar is particularly interesting as a case study of regime transition in rural 
developing countries because of the country's unique attempts to preserve interventionist 
policies. However, with the exception of a survey conducted by the International Rice Research 
Institute in 1996 (Garcia et al. 2000) and a few village surveys conducted by Japanese 
economists (see below), little research on Myanmar's rural economy is available and the effects 
of these interventionist policies on household welfare are not well documented. One important 
contribution of this paper, therefore, is to present a cross-sectional view of the behavior and 
welfare of rural households based on a primary dataset which is more recent, provides more 
detailed information, and covers more geographically diverse regions than previous studies. 
Our research mainly builds on the work by Takahashi (2000) and Garcia et al. (2000), 
who analyzed several agro-ecological regions and the whole household economy. Takahashi's 
(2000) study examined the early stage of transition (1987-95) when the new market incentives 
were the most effective, and our work picks up where Takahashi (2000) left off, investigating 
the succeeding period. Garcia et al. (2000) and our own study share the same motivation and 
arrive at similar results: both show that average income was lower in villages using 
newly-adopted, high-cost irrigated paddy farming. However, while Garcia et al. (2000) 
attributed their finding to the fact that the technology had only just been adopted, our results 
suggest low incomes in these villages persist and therefore cannot be regarded as transitory, 
associated with the adoption of new technologies. Furthermore, whereas Garcia et al. (2000) 
focused on the Ayeyarwady Delta, our study includes regions outside the delta, covering several 
farming systems that are based on non-paddy crops.  
                                                  
2 In this paper, "paddy" means unhusked paddy and "rice" means husked, cleaned rice for consumption.   4
Other studies that examine the effects of agricultural policies on Myanmar's village 
and household economy during the period we are interested in include Okamoto (2004), Fujita 
and Okamoto (2000), and Fujita (2003).
3 All of these, however, are case studies of paddy 
villages located close to Yangon, the national capital, and therefore do not allow a regional 
comparison. Including villages in the periphery as well as villages whose main agricultural 
activity is based on non-paddy crops, the present study is thus the first of its kind, allowing an 
examination of regional disparities based on detailed household-level analysis. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an outline of Myanmar's 
agricultural development and policies. Section 3 describes the regions and sample households 
that are the subject of this study. The remaining three sections analyze the nature and 
determinants of the observed income disparities: section 4 examines household incomes and 
briefly discusses the incidence of poverty, section 5 investigates agricultural incomes, and 
section 6 examines non-agricultural incomes in more detail. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Myanmar's Economy and Agricultural Policies 
 
With a population of over 50 million and endowed with bountiful land resources 
(approximately 0.7 million km
2), Myanmar enjoys a favorable man-land ratio by Asian 
standards. Industrial development is under way, but currently agriculture remains the dominant 
sector in the national economy (table 1). Substantial progress has been made in terms of sown 
acreage, production, and exports, but the achievements fall far short of the country's potential. 
The partial success is most clearly shown in paddy/rice production trends. Rice is the 
staple food in Myanmar, accounting for 20% of urban and 22% of rural consumption 
                                                  
3 In the political economy literature, Thawnghmung (2001) found results similar to ours based on comprehensive 
interviews on political issues in various regions in Myanmar. She did not collect detailed household data, though.   5
expenditure in 1997 (CSO 2002). Paddy production increased rapidly from the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s (figure 1). Despite this increase, though, the yield level is still only three tons per 
hectare, which is considerably lower than that of Asian neighbors such as Vietnam. Two main 
factors explain the surge in production during the early 1990s. The first is agricultural 
marketing liberalization in 1987 (followed by the official abandonment of "Burmese 
Socialism" in 1988) and the second is the introduction of the Summer Paddy Program in 
1992/93.  
Agricultural policy under "Burmese Socialism," the doctrine pursued by General Ne 
Win's military government that ruled the country after overthrowing the elected government in 
1962, was based on three pillars. First, all farmland belonged to the state and farmers were 
given a tillage right only. Farmers did not have the official right to exchange, transfer, lease, 
inherit, or mortgage their land, although children were usually given the right to cultivate their 
parents' land. Another aspect related to the state ownership of land was the existence of a large 
pool of landless, non-farm households in rural Myanmar. Under the land reform scheme that 
started in the late 1950s, land was not distributed to all village residents equally but only to 
those who owned means of production such as bullocks. The unequal land distribution was 
institutionalized during "Burmese Socialism": only those households that were given tillage 
rights were officially registered as farm households. Members of non-farm households, 
working as agricultural laborers, had to depend on these farm households. The second pillar 
was the state monopoly of agricultural marketing. Private trade of surplus produce was banned, 
both domestically and internationally. The state attempted to procure all the surplus from 
farmers at fixed prices. The third pillar was crop planning. The government told farmers which 
crop to grow on which parcel of land. If farmers did not follow government directions, their 
tillage rights could be revoked. Through this threat, the government wanted to prevent farmers   6
from shifting to more lucrative crops that were not covered by the state procurement system. 
The change of government in 1988, when Ne Win was forced to step down and the 
military regime that is still in power today took over, brought a number of changes in 
agricultural policy. The system of state ownership of land remained more or less intact, though 
unofficial transfers of tillage rights have been frequent (Takahashi 2000). To retain their tillage 
right for paddy fields, farmers are obliged to grow paddy crops and supply a designated amount 
of paddy to the government procurement system, regardless of the profitability of paddy crops. 
There has been little change in the unequal distribution of tillage rights and the share of landless, 
non-farm households in villages typically ranges from 20 to 50%. 
As for agricultural marketing, several reforms were introduced.
4 In 1987, compulsory 
state procurement was abandoned and private trade was allowed. However, the state 
procurement system was soon restored for paddy and so-called "industrial crops" (sugarcane, 
cotton, jute, and rubber).
5 Under the system that prevailed during our survey, the state procured 
from farmers a limited amount of paddy for urban rice consumers (government employees, 
hospitals, and other social welfare institutions). It also procured industrial crops for state-owned 
industries. In contrast to the socialist period, once farmers had supplied their required quota to 
the state, they were free to sell any surplus in private markets. Although rice exports still fell 
under the state monopoly, there was active domestic paddy/rice marketing by private traders. 
Since market prices during the late 1980s and early 1990s were usually much higher than the 
procurement price, the reform gave a substantial incentive to produce a surplus. 
The procurement quota for paddy was set as a fixed quantity per acre of land 
designated as paddy fields. In the main paddy-growing areas, the quota was approximately 20% 
                                                  
4 For details on the liberalization of agricultural marketing in Myanmar and its consequences, see Okamoto (2004). 
5 In 1999/2000 and 2000/01, the government attempted to extend the procurement system to pulses, the export of 
which through private traders had grown remarkably during the 1990s. The attempt was abolished, however, after 
two years of experiments.   7
of the gross produce, while it was lower in other areas. Since the quota was set irrespective of 
the actual acreage devoted to paddy or the actual output of paddy, this may seem to be a 
non-distortionary implicit tax. In reality, however, the system adversely affected paddy 
production in Myanmar because of the incentive effects it created. The first of these was a 
disincentive effect on the quality of rice that was supplied to the state, which was so low that it 
was not accepted in foreign markets. Lower and upper class urban residents sold the quota rice 
they received to livestock feed dealers. The second effect regards the incentives that influenced 
farmers' cropping choice. This is discussed in detail further below.  
The third pillar of agricultural policy during the socialist period was crop planning. 
This was officially abandoned in 1987. However, farmers continued to face the threat of seeing 
their tillage rights revoked if they deviated too much from crop plans formulated by the 
government, especially with respect to paddy.
6 
Under the institutional setting described above, the government has given high priority 
to the expansion of paddy production, since it believes that a stable supply of rice is a 
prerequisite for political stability. For example, the Summer Paddy Program instituted in 
1992/93 has promoted the production of so called "summer paddy" (dry season paddy) by 
investing in irrigation. Traditionally, the main paddy season in Myanmar was the monsoon 
season, which brings sufficient (and frequently too much) water to paddy crops in rainfed fields. 
Under the program, numerous small to medium scale dams were constructed in some areas, 
while private investment in small scale diesel pumps was promoted in others, depending on the 
topology with respect to water availability during the dry season. The additional output from 
summer paddy was basically exempted from procurement quotas. As we have already seen, 
both the area under cultivation and paddy production rose remarkably in the early 1990s (figure 
                                                  
6 Each parcel of farmland was classified into one of the six categories: paddy fields, dry land for upland crops, 
alluvial land, garden land, nipa palm land, and shifting cultivation land. The classification is almost permanent,   8
1). The main driving force behind this expansion was the increased acreage of summer paddy 
with irrigation (Garcia et al. 2000). The recent development in irrigation is shown in table 1. 
Since the end of the 1990s, the impact of the summer paddy drive has weakened due to 
the exhaustion of easy opportunities for irrigation and low paddy prices for producers (Fujita 
2003). Due to the ban on private sector rice exports, the low quality of rice in the public 
marketing channel, and managerial inefficiency at the state trade agency, rice exports from 
Myanmar did not increase as fast as output, resulting in lower market prices of paddy for 
farmers. The market premium over the procurement price fell from the range of 50-120% to 
approximately 30% in the early 2000s. This implies that the disparity between international and 
domestic market prices widened. According to Fujita's (2003) estimates, the domestic price in 
2001 was almost half the price of Thai rice (25% broken) calculated at the market exchange 
rate. 
Although the rice-centered agricultural policies in Myanmar ensured that the nation's 
rice demand was met at low prices, we are concerned that this may have been achieved at the 
expense of farmers' welfare. The increase in paddy production was attained primarily by 
expanding the area under cultivation (figure 1). The area expansion was more or less forced by 
the government through the agricultural policies described above. Because of the economic 
distortions created by these policies, the transition of Myanmar's rural economy from a planned 
to a market one has been partial. The state-led market economy has been strongly oriented 
towards the maximization of paddy output, with little consideration for farmers' incomes. It is 
against this background that we conducted our field surveys to quantify the impact of these 
policies on rural households' welfare. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
implying that a plot of garden land remains garden land even if the farmer grows paddy on it, for example.    9
3 Characteristics of Sample Villages and Households 
 
3.1 Village Characteristics 
In June-October 2001, we conducted a survey of sample households belonging to eight 
selected villages in Myanmar. The characteristics of the villages are shown in table 2.
7 
The first two villages (DELTA1 and DELTA 2) are located in the delta regions of lower 
Myanmar. DELTA1 was chosen to evaluate the Summer Paddy Program because almost all of 
the paddy fields have been under summer paddy cultivation using diesel-pumped water since 
the early 1990s. In DELTA2, summer paddy production was introduced in 1999 when a small 
dam was built nearby; however, the canal irrigation system was still under construction at the 
time of our survey.  
Three villages were chosen from the dry zone of upper Myanmar. DRY1 is located in 
the Mandalay Basin, which has been one of Myanmar's centers of commercial crop production 
due to its long history of canal irrigation dating back to the dynastic period of Burma. In 
contrast, DRY2 and DRY3 represent villages relying on rainfed agriculture. Complicated crop 
mixtures of pulses and oilseed crops are observed in both villages. Intercultivation is also 
popular. DRY2 is more typical as a dry zone village since only rainfed crops and no paddy crops 
are grown there. In DRY3, paddy crops are grown either under rainfed conditions or using 
small-scale tank irrigation. A large-scale dam was under construction at the time of our survey, 
which, once completed, will supply irrigation water to DRY3.  
HILL1 and HILL2 represent villages relying on vegetable-based development in hilly 
regions. HILL1's agriculture includes small-scale vegetable growing on the floating plots of 
Inya Lake. Tomatoes from this region are famous throughout the country. The cultivation of 
                                                  
7 The smallest administrative unit in Myanmar is the "village tract," which usually consists of several natural 
villages. While table 2 refers to "village tracts," in the text and the following tables, we will simply refer to   10
sugarcane, one of the industrial crops falling under the state procurement system, is also 
common in HILL1. HILL2 specializes more in vegetables grown on upland fields. Both 
villages sell their vegetables to major consumption centers such as Yangon and Mandalay, 
while their paddy cultivation is oriented towards subsistence. 
The last village of the study, COAST, lies in the coastal region of southern Myanmar, 
where tropical agro-forestry (rubber, fruits, cashew nuts, etc.) prevails. Peasant farmers run 
both small-scale rubber estates and paddy farms. Among the eight villages studied, COAST has 
the most active non-farm sector, which includes general shops, cycle taxis, and fish processing.  
The eight villages chosen are thus quite representative of the diverse agro-ecosystems 
found in Myanmar. The villages can be classified into two groups in two ways. First, if we focus 
on paddy versus non-paddy based cropping, the first three (DELTA1, DELTA2, and DRY1) are 
representative of paddy-based agriculture in Myanmar, while the last five (DRY2, DRY3, 
HILL1, HILL2, and COAST) are representative of more diversified agriculture. Public 
investment in agriculture has been concentrated in the first group.
8 Second, in the context of 
Burma's political history, the first five (DELTA1, DELTA2, DRY1, DRY2, and DRY3) 
represent the "center," while the last three (HILL1, HILL2, and COAST) represent the 
"periphery."
9 The former is mostly inhabited by ethnic Burmese and has been under the control 
of the central authorities throughout Burmese history. In contrast, HILL1 and HILL2 are 
inhabited by ethnic minorities (like the Inda, the Pao, etc.), while COAST is located farthest 
from the national capital.  
Before choosing the specific villages for this study, one of the authors (Fujita) visited a 
number of villages in order to ascertain that they would be representative of each region. As far 
                                                                                                                                                             
"villages" for convenience' sake.  
8 Existing studies (see introduction) have concentrated on villages comparable to DELTA1 and DELTA2. Only  the 
study by Takahashi (2000) also surveyed villages in the dry zone and the hilly regions. 
9 For an outline of Burmese history, see Adas (1978), Cheng (1968), and Cady (1958), on which this assessment is   11
as can be judged by the statistics on cropping pattern and land distribution, we achieved our aim. 
After the survey, however, we found that village DRY2 was better off than the regional average, 
thanks to the recent introduction of rural development projects, including micro-credit schemes 
funded by international agencies. With regard to the other seven villages, we do not have such 
concerns. In the survey year 2001, paddy prices in private markets were at their lowest in recent 
years. Since then, prices have recovered somewhat, but at the time of writing were still only 
marginally higher than in 2001. Villages DRY3 and HILL2 were hit by adverse weather during 
our survey year, so that the farming income we recorded probably fell below that of an average 
year.  
 
3.2 Survey Methodology 
To conduct our survey, we chose sample households from a complete list of 
households in each of the villages studied. While these households are not strictly a random 
sample, we used information obtained from village leaders and local administrations to 
eliminate discretionary elements, so that the sample households are as representative as 
possible in terms of the distribution of farmland and primary jobs. A total of 521 households 
were surveyed in the eight villages: 341 households were officially registered as "farm" 
households and 180 as "non-farm" households (table 3). 
Households registered as "farm" households are given official tillage rights. But 
because of inter-vivo transfers of farmland and tenancy contracts, not all households registered 
as "farm" households actually cultivate their land, while some households registered as 
"non-farm" households do cultivate farmland. In the table, we refer to the latter type of 
households as "non-farm with farmland." In contrast, we make no distinction between "farm" 
                                                                                                                                                             
based.    12
households that do and that do not cultivate their land, because "farm" households' social and 
economic status remains unaffected by this: they belong to the class of landed farmers in rural 
Myanmar. 
We classify households registered as "non-farm" into three types. The first is the de 
facto farmers: "non-farm with farmland" (the total size of this group in our sample is 14 out of 
180, see table 3). The remaining non-farm households are divided into those whose main source 
of income is agricultural labor ("non-farm, agric. labor" in the table) and those whose main 
income source is non-agricultural activities ("non-farm, non-agric."). There are 107 "non-farm, 
agric. labor" households and 59 "non-farm, non-agric." households in our sample. 
Among the agricultural laborer households, two types of labor contracts are important 
in rural Myanmar. Daily-hired laborers are usually paid in cash and hired for a well-specified 
farm operation. In contrast, seasonally-hired laborers are employed for a cropping season and 
paid in cash, paddy, clothes, etc. They are responsible for various farm operations, just like 
family workers. Details of the contracts differ from village to village, from operation to 
operation, and over time (Takahashi 2000). 
A structured questionnaire was used for all households to establish household 
characteristics, such as the age, sex, education, working status, and earnings of each member; 
household assets, such as land, livestock, agricultural machinery, and transportation equipment; 
consumption; and debt and credit, including informal transactions. If households operated 
farmland, another part was added, asking about cropping patterns, the use of hired labor, the 
cost of production of major crops, and how much of the output was sold to the state or private 
merchants on what conditions. Household heads or other relevant persons were interviewed by 
local research assistants and the information was cross-checked on the spot by the authors to 
ensure internal consistency and data quality.   13
 
3.3 Characteristics of Sample Households 
Table 4 shows the demographic characteristics of the sample households. The average 
household size was 5.5 persons. Almost all households in the sample were nuclear families. 
Therefore, the variation in household size comes from the variation in the number of 
co-resident children. The majority of the household heads have received an education, either at 
a monastery or a modern school. The only exception is village HILL1, where more than 20% of 
household heads were without any education. The number of average schooling years for those 
who had attended a modern school was not very high, indicating that most only received 
primary education. Among children at schooling age, the primary enrollment ratio was almost 
100% in all villages. 
The sample households did not own many assets (table 5). The most important asset of 
most households was livestock: the majority of sample farmers owned draft animals and a 
number of sample households (both farm and non-farm households) kept pigs and poultry. As 
for agricultural machinery, none of the households owned a four-wheel tractor, but ownership 
of two-wheel power tillers was spreading. A number of farmers were still dependent on animal 
power for traction. Bicycles were common among villagers but motorcycles and four-wheel 
vehicles for transportation were very rare. The highest value of total household assets was 
found in COAST, where several villagers owned motorcycles and four-wheel vehicles. Because 
all of the eight villages (as the majority of villages in Myanmar) were not electrified, ownership 
of TVs or VCRs (using batteries) was very rare. Comparing different household types, total 
asset values were lowest among non-farm, agricultural laborer households, indicating that they 
belong to the poorest section in the village economy. 
Because farmland is not officially private property, the value of land managed by the   14
household is not summed up in the table. The average holding size among farm households was 
8.6 acres, which is large by South-East Asian standards. 
These, then, are the assets and the human capital which form the basis of economic life 
in the villages of Myanmar. The following sections take a closer look at the village economies, 
with section 4 focusing on income levels and distribution and sections 5 and 6 examining factor 
allocation and sources of income by type.  
 
4 Level and Distribution of Household Income 
 
4.1 Level of Household Income 
We follow the standard definition of household income (Grosh and Glewwe 2000). 
Household income is defined as the sum of wage/salary receipts including the imputed value of 
in-kind payment such as meals and rice, non-agricultural self-employment earnings (gross 
revenue minus actually paid costs), agricultural self-employment earnings (sum of the value of 
output minus actually paid costs), and net receipts of non-earned income (which is negative in 
the case of payments such as taxes and for licenses). In the study region, non-cash transfers are 
frequent. The most important are the paddy produced by farmers and consumed by themselves 
and in-kind payment to workers. Median market prices within each village were used to impute 
the value of these transactions. 
Table 6 shows the level of household income thus estimated. Overall averages were 
184,000 Kyats per household and 36,000 Kyats per person per year.
10 If we convert these 
figures at the market exchange rate of 650 Kyats/US$, average annual incomes were $283 per 
household and $55 per person. Incomes thus were indeed low, but not that different from the 
                                                  
10 To convert figures into per capita terms, we simply used the number of household members. The use of adult 
equivalence is left for further exercises.   15
average village in rural Myanmar. If we convert these incomes using the price of rice in the 
Yangon market (56 Kyats/kg), they are equivalent to 3,300 kg of rice per household and 640 kg 
per person per year, although we have to be careful in interpreting these figures because the 
domestic rice price in Myanmar was much below the international price. 
Total household income was highest in COAST, followed by DRY1 and DRY2.
11 
DRY3 had the lowest income. Incomes in DELTA1 and DELTA2 fell below the overall average. 
HILL1 and HILL2 were in the middle. The ranking is similar when per capita income is 
compared. Among household types, "non-farm, agric. labor" households had the lowest income, 
closely followed by "non-farm, with farmland" households. The highest income per capita was 
recorded for "non-farm, non-agric." households. 
Comparing different villages and household types, farm households in DRY1, DRY2, 
and COAST were much better-off than in other villages. The income level of farm households 
in DELTA1 and DELTA2 was again lower than the overall average. Non-agricultural 
households in DRY1 and COAST were much better-off than in other villages. Agricultural 
laborer households were worse-off than farm households and than non-agricultural households 
in general. Exceptions are found in HILL1 where non-agricultural households were worse-off 
than agricultural laborer households because non-agricultural earning opportunities were 
limited in this village.  
 
4.2 Income Inequality and Poverty 
Inequality measures of total household income are shown in table 7. Among the 
villages, COAST and DRY2 had the highest inequality. The two villages in the delta, the two in 
                                                  
11 The sample in COAST includes an exceptionally rich household. This household ran a transport business using 
its own vehicles. However, excluding this household does not alter the ranking among villages in table 6. 
Furthermore, since this household was demographically large, the per capita income of this household does not 
seem to be an outlier.    16
the hilly regions, and DRY3 showed the lowest inequality. DRY1 was in between. Comparing 
household types, the incomes of farm and non-farm, non-agricultural households on average 
were higher than those of other households, but had a larger inter-household variation.  
The table suggests a negative correlation between average income at the village level 
and intra-village variation of income. Takahashi (2000) reported that the liberalization of 
agricultural marketing improved farm incomes and induced rich farmers to expand 
self-employed, non-farm business activities, leading to an increase in intra-village inequality. 
This seems like a good explanation of the patterns observed in villages COAST and DRY1. The 
high income inequality in DRY2 is attributable to the high risk of dry farming, where 
idiosyncratic yield shocks amplified the income inequality among villagers. 
To estimate poverty indicators in terms of per capita incomes, we adopt our own 
poverty line at 400 kg of rice per person per year. This is because there is no official poverty line 
in Myanmar and it is not feasible to apply the World Bank's poverty line of PPP$1/day due to 
multiple exchange rates and the non-availability of disaggregated household expenditure data. 
Assuming a per capita consumption of rice of 200 kg (and its equivalents) per person per year, 
the poverty line here implies that 50% of income is spent on basic food. Our impression is that 
this poverty line is close to the one used by Garcia et al. (2000) but probably much lower than 
PPP$1/day. 
Based on this poverty line, our estimate for the poverty headcount index for the sample 
households was 42% (table 7). The village ranking of poverty incidence and the ranking of per 
capita income shown in table 6 are substantially different. Among the top three high-income 
villages (DRY1, DRY2, and COAST), only DRY1 and COAST had a poverty incidence lower 
than the overall average of 42%. In DRY2, because of high inequality, poverty incidence was 
also high despite the village's high average income. Within the delta, the incidence of poverty in   17
DELTA1 was higher than the average while in DELTA2 it was the lowest among the eight 
villages due to the low degree of inequality. DRY3, the village with the lowest average income, 
had the highest poverty incidence. Other poverty measures such as the poverty gap index and 
the squared poverty gap index confirm this pattern (not shown).  
 
4.3 Household Income Sources 
Table 8 shows household income classified into five major sources: (1) 
self-employment income from agriculture, (2) agricultural wage income (daily-hired), (3) 
agricultural wage income (seasonally-hired), (4) non-agricultural income, and (5) unearned 
income transfers (net receipts of non-earned income). Among household types, by definition, 
"farm" households had the highest income from agricultural self-employment and "non-farm, 
agric. labor" households had the highest income from daily-hired farm wages and from 
seasonally-hired farm wages. More interestingly, non-agricultural income was a major source 
of income for all types of households. Even "farm" households depended on non-agricultural 
income for 21% of their total income.  
The composition of income is strikingly different among villages. The level of 
self-employment income from agriculture was highest in villages DRY1 and DRY2 and lowest 
in DRY3. The share of agricultural self-employment income in total household income was 
highest in villages HILL2 and DRY1 and lowest in COAST. Seasonally-hired farm labor 
income was important in DELTA2. In this village, income from this source was as high as the 
daily-hired farm labor income. The level of non-agricultural income also varied widely among 
villages.  
 
4.4 Regional Disparity in Income   18
A comparison of tables 6 and 8 shows that villages with higher agricultural 
self-employment incomes and higher non-agricultural incomes have higher per capita incomes 
overall. Because of this relationship, in the next two sections, we will take a closer look at these 
two income sources and the impacts of agricultural policies on them.  
The comparison also suggests that household incomes are higher in villages in the 
"periphery" (HILL1, HILL2, and COAST) than in the "center" that is tightly controlled by the 
central authorities (all other villages). Since commercial agriculture and non-agricultural 
activities usually prosper in regions close to urban centers, not in peripheral regions (Rozelle et 
al. 1999), we call this the first paradox. The paradox is most clearly shown comparing DELTA1 
and DELTA2 on the one hand and COAST on the other hand. However, the regional disparity is 
not very clear among other villages: household incomes in HILL2 are low and those in DRY1 
and DRY2 are high, for example. The low income in HILL2 is mainly due to crop failures in 
vegetables in the survey year. From other indicators of the village economy, such as housing, 
household assets, debt positions, and rural wages, the income level of this village in an average 
year seems to lie between that in HILL1 and COAST, possibly closer to that in COAST. DRY3 
has the lowest household and also farm income among the study villages. This is partly due to 
crop failures, but even with a normal harvest, we would expect its income level still to be at the 
bottom of the eight villages. Other indicators also suggest that the welfare level in DRY3 is 
lowest. The reason for the higher income in DRY1 and DRY2 will be explored in the following 
sections. 
 
5 Land Allocation and Agricultural Income 
 
5.1 Cropping Pattern of Sample Farmers   19
Self-employment income from agriculture is the sum of crop income, livestock 
income, agricultural machinery rental income, land rent income, and backyard crop income. 
Since crop income accounted for the largest share (98.6%) of the agricultural self-employment 
income, we focus on the allocation of land to various crops and the determinants of crop income 
in this section. In the analysis, we classify the crops grown by the sample households into the 
following six categories:  
(1) Paddy: this is a staple food subject to heavy policy intervention (section 2). It is 
important to distinguish between summer paddy (which is intensive in input use, but the 
production of which has expanded recently as irrigation has spread) and other types of paddy 
(mainly monsoon paddy grown on designated paddy fields). 
(2) Pulses: of the different pulses, the production of green gram, black gram, and 
pigeon pea has expanded rapidly in recent years, driven by price incentives based on exports 
through private traders (Okamoto 2004). 
(3) Oilseed crops: sesame and groundnuts traditionally are the most important oilseed 
crops; their cultivation is concentrated in the dry zone. 
(4) Vegetables: various kinds of vegetables are grown in Myanmar; they are not 
subject to any direct intervention by the state. 
(5) Industrial crops: in the survey villages, sugarcane, cotton, and rubber are grown; 
farmers are obliged to deliver specified quantities to state-owned enterprises at the official 
procurement price. 
(6) Other crops: other crops grown in the survey villages are non-paddy cereals and 
fruits. 
Table 9 shows the average farm size and cropping patterns. The average size of paddy 
field per farm household was larger in villages DELTA1 and DELTA2. There were no paddy   20
fields in DRY2. The total farm size was largest in DELTA2, followed by DRY2 and HILL1. 
Cropping intensity was quite high, especially in DRY2 where complicated intercultivation was 
practiced.
12 
Of the major crop groups, paddy occupied more than 60% in three paddy-based 
villages (DELTA1, DELTA2, and DRY1). Among these villages, DELTA1 had the least 
diversified cropping pattern: monsoon paddy followed by summer paddy. In contrast, in 
DELTA2 and DRY1, not all of the paddy fields were cropped with summer paddy but some 
fields were cropped with pulses (DELTA2) and vegetables (DRY1). The other five villages had 
a more diversified agriculture. Among these five villages, DRY3 and COAST had higher paddy 
shares than the other three. 
The inter-village variation in cropping patterns reflects not only the agro-ecological 
conditions of each village, but also differences in the enforcement of the government's crop 
plan. In DELTA1, which showed little variation in cropping patterns within the village, tillage 
rights were verified and updated every year by government officials. Farmers in DELTA1 were 
given directions on the acreage of monsoon and summer paddy and the quantity to be procured. 
As these directions were written on the tillage right record distributed to each household, the 
link of tillage rights and the crop plan/procurement was explicit. In DELTA2, tillage rights were 
not updated every year and only the cultivable acreage, not the actual acreage, of paddy was 
recorded by officials in a form distributed to each household. Farmers in DRY1 were subject to 
an annual verification and update of their tillage rights. However, only the acreage of monsoon 
paddy on paddy fields was investigated, leaving farmers greater freedom in their choices of 
crops during the dry season. 
In DRY2 and DRY3, the link between tillage rights and the cropping pattern was 
                                                  
12 In calculating crop acreage, we divided the acreage of fields intercultivated with multiple crops proportionally to 
the number of rows in which the plants were sown.   21
traditionally a weak one. In the late 1990s, however, the government began distributing forms 
to farmers on which their cropping patterns were recorded, as in DELTA2. In HILL1 and 
HILL2, no documents to record tillage rights or cropping patterns were distributed to 
households. Farmers in COAST were provided with a tillage right record, which only specified 
the acreage of farmland without directions on crop choices and procurement obligations. 
To summarize the differences in the enforcement of the government's crop plan on 
farmers: strict enforcement along procedures inherited from the socialist period was attempted 
in the three villages located in the core regions of paddy-based agriculture; this policy was 
implemented most strictly in DELTA1; at the time of our survey, the procedure was being 
extended to the other two villages located in the "center" in the political sense but outside the 
core regions of agricultural development; and the three villages politically at the "periphery" 
were subject to the weakest enforcement of crop plans. 
 
5.2 Profitability of Crops 
Next, we look at the relationship among cropping patterns, per acre farm income, and 
per acre profitability of individual crops. Table 10 shows that crop income per farm household 
was highest in DRY2 and lowest in DRY3 and DELTA1. Normalized by farm size, crop income 
per farm area was highest in DRY1 and HILL2, followed by DRY2, and lowest in DRY3, 
DELTA2, and DELTA1. A comparison of tables 9 and 10 suggests that per acre income was 
lowest for paddy and highest for vegetables. Therefore, farm income per acre was lower in  
villages where paddy cropping was more dominant than in other villages.  
To investigate the relationship between cropping patterns and profitability within 
villages, intra-village correlation coefficients between average crop income per acre of a farm 
(denoted as x) and cropping patterns (share of the acreage assigned to each crop group in the   22
gross cropped area) were calculated (table 11). In all villages, the correlation coefficient 
between x and the paddy share was negative. It was statistically significant in DELTA2, DRY1, 
DRY3, HILL2, and COAST. There was no meaningful variation in DELTA1, since most 
farmers grew monsoon paddy and summer paddy only, while no paddy was grown in DRY2. In 
DELTA2, the correlation coefficient between x and the pulses share was 0.448. In DRY1, the 
correlation coefficient between x and the vegetables share was 0.555. Therefore, in DELTA2 
and DRY1, villages located in the major paddy growing regions, farmers who did not grow 
much paddy on paddy field during the summer season but grew more commercial crops instead 
were better-off.
13 This indicates that the policy of maximizing paddy output put a heavy burden 
on farmers in the major paddy-growing regions.  
In the other five villages, where agriculture was more diversified, each village had 
non-paddy crops whose acreage share was positively correlated with x. In these villages, it is 
not always the case that these non-paddy crops directly compete with paddy for land, because 
these crops are usually grown on farmland not designated as paddy fields. Even then, the 
allocation of labor and efforts expended on non-paddy crops should be adversely affected when 
paddy acreage is increased. In DRY3, where such conflicts are the most acute and a new 
irrigation dam was under construction during the survey period, the correlation coefficient 
between x and the paddy share was -0.529. Therefore, in the minor paddy-producing regions 
too, the policy of maximizing paddy output put a heavy burden on farmers. 
 
5.3 Structure of Production Costs 
Why do some crops deliver a higher income per acre than others? To investigate this, 
we collected detailed information on the cost of production of major crops from a subset of 
                                                  
13 In DRY1, not all vegetables are grown on paddy fields. When we re-calculated the correlation coefficient using 
the share of dry chili only, which was exclusively grown on paddy fields, the coefficient became 0.320, still   23
sample farmers. The questionnaire includes detailed accounting of the use of daily-hired labor, 
seasonally-hired labor, family labor, hired and family-owned animals, hired and family-owned 
machinery, formal and informal credits used for production, and so on. Table 12 summarizes 
this information for each crop in a village when five or more observations were collected (see 
also appendix table). Although opportunity costs are not relevant for the calculation of income, 
they are when evaluating crop profitability, which is calculated by subtracting the opportunity 
cost of owned factors from crop income. In other words, crop income discussed above is the 
sum of profits (operator's surplus) and the imputed value of owned factors.
14  
In the case of paddy in the major paddy-producing regions (panel A of table 12), the 
contrast between summer paddy (SP) and monsoon paddy (MP) is worth mentioning. In 
DELTA1, although output value per acre was much higher for SP than for MP, value-added, 
income, and profit per acre for the two were similar.
15 This is because SP in DELTA1 is 
irrigated by pumps, which is intensive in the use of diesel oil. As a result, SP is not very 
attractive for farmers, although it is attractive for local administrators because of higher yields 
per acre (Fujita 2003). In DELTA2, the profitability of MP, late MP,
16 and SP was similar. In 
DRY1, because the output value per acre was much higher for SP than for MP, value-added, 
income, and profit per acre were also higher for SP. This is because SP in DRY1 was irrigated 
by canals, for which farmers paid little. When a sufficient number of observations is available, 
we calculated the cost of production separately for large-scale farmers and small-scale farmers. 
In none of the cases did large-scale farmers record higher value-added, income, or profit per 
acre than small-scale farmers, indicating the absence of positive scale economies (see appendix 
                                                                                                                                                             
statistically significant at 5%. 
14 We make no attempt at estimating the factor payment to land. This is left for further analyses. 
15 Output was evaluated at market prices for the quantity marketed and consumed, and at the government 
procurement price for the quantity delivered to the government.  
16 Late MP is a variety of paddy grown after the water level decreases. In DELTA2, the cultivation of late MP starts 
three months later than that of regular MP.    24
table). 
The final column in table 12 shows figures for profitability when all output was 
calculated at market prices. The different results of this calculation when compared with the 
one above show the direct and very short-run effect of the procurement system on paddy 
income. Because market prices were higher than the procurement price, the figures in the final 
column are mostly larger than the figures in column (7). Nevertheless, the difference is very 
small. This is because the survey year was a trough year for domestic market prices of paddy. 
When we re-calculated profitability using market trend prices, which were much higher than 
the actually prevailing market prices recorded at the time of the survey, the income and profits 
per acre from paddy production became much higher (Fujita 2003). Since domestic prices of 
current inputs such as fertilizer, diesel, and chemicals were close to their international prices 
during the survey period, we can infer, from the exercise of raising the imputed price of paddy, 
the direct and very short-run impacts on paddy incomes of the policy of repressing domestic 
rice prices below the international price level. Since the indirect and long-run impacts are likely 
to be more important, we do not report the results of this exercise. 
Outside the major paddy-producing regions, the cultivation of paddy crops was less 
profitable (panel B of table 12) than in the major paddy-producing regions (panel A). The 
paddy income per acre was highest in COAST, comparable to the income in DRY1. This is 
mainly attributable to higher paddy prices in COAST due to geographic isolation. Yet, the 
paddy profit per acre was negative in COAST. For a variety of reason, the paddy income per 
acre in the other three villages was lower than in COAST: the production of monsoon paddy in 
DRY3 is subject to erratic rainfall; monsoon paddy in HILL1 is grown on marginal lands on the 
coastal edge of a lake; and in HILL2, monsoon paddy is grown on tiny paddy plots in hill 
valleys or as an upland field crop. When all output was calculated at market prices, the income   25
and profit of paddy cultivation rose but still fell far short of reaching parity with that of 
non-paddy crops. 
Panel C of table 12 shows the cost of production per acre for non-paddy crops. For 
almost all of these crops, per acre income was higher than for paddy crops in the same village. 
Among these crops, some compete directly with summer paddy, such as pulses in DELTA2 and 
oilseed crops and vegetables in DRY1, because they are grown on paddy fields. It therefore 
seems that farmers would be able to earn more if they grew more of these crops instead of 
growing paddy to the limit. 
 
5.4 Disparity in Crop Income and Irrigation Development 
The analysis in this section has shown that farmers and villages that emphasize a 
paddy-based, irrigated cropping system have lower farming incomes than those that do not. 
Since irrigation development usually contributes to rapid increases in land productivity and 
farmers' income in Asia (Jimenez 1995; Huang and Rozelle 2002), we call the situation in 
Myanmar the second paradox.  
Among the villages in the major paddy-producing regions in the "center" (DELTA1, 
DELTA2, and DRY1), crop income per acre is lowest in DELTA1 and highest in DRY1. The 
crop income is higher in DELTA2 than in DELTA1 because the summer paddy promotion was 
introduced more recently, the government's crop plans were not strictly enforced, and a 
lucrative alternative to paddy, i.e., pulses, existed. Crop income is highest in DRY1 because the 
enforcement of the government policy to maximize paddy output was weak so that villagers 
were able to capture the huge agricultural growth potential in the dry zone by growing various 
commercial crops.  
Among the villages outside the major paddy-producing regions, both the crop income   26
per household and per acre are lowest in DRY3. The low income in DRY3 is not only 
attributable to crop failures, but is also caused by the paddy output maximization policy 
extended to marginal regions. The correlation analysis shows that farmers who grew more 
paddy in DRY3 had a lower farm income than fellow villagers who did not. 
Thus, the second paradox is not really a paradox. What was responsible for the low 
farm income of the paddy-based, irrigated cropping system was not irrigation development per 
se, but the enforcement of the paddy output maximization policy. 
 
6 Labor Allocation and Non-Agricultural Income 
 
6.1 Labor Allocation of Sample Households 
In the survey, we collected information on individuals' occupations, which we divided 
into three categories of agricultural jobs and twenty of non-agricultural jobs. These categories 
were based on the sector and the employment type of each activity. After a preliminary analysis, 
we merged the twenty categories of non-agricultural jobs into the following eight:  
(1) Self-employed in the primary sector other than agriculture: this category includes 
those who are self-employed
17 in the primary sector other than agriculture, such as fishermen 
and collectors of forest products. 
(2) Self-employed in rice milling: this category includes those who are self-employed 
in rice milling; because small-scale rice milling is one of the most common rural industries in 
Myanmar, we distinguish self-employed rice millers from others in this section.  
(3) Self-employed in the secondary sector other than rice milling: this category 
includes those who are self-employed in the secondary sector other than self-employed 
                                                  
17 The self-employed include unpaid family members and those who run a business.   27
rice-millers, such as artisans (carpenter, craftsman) and those running small-scale, agro-based 
manufacturing units. 
(4) Self-employed in trade: this category includes those who are self-employed in 
trade, such as agricultural brokers, livestock traders, shopkeepers, and vendors. 
(5) Self-employed in transportation: this category includes those who are 
self-employed in transport business using bullock carts, cycle rickshaws, motorcycles, etc.  
(6) Daily-hired employees: this category includes those who are regarded as daily 
laborers; the majority of them work in construction. 
(7) Regularly-hired employees: this category includes those who are employed on a 
regular basis by shops, factories, companies, or by the government.  
(8) Others: this category includes those who work in non-agricultural activities that are 
not included in the above seven categories; examples are those self-employed in rental shops 
for batteries, speakers, and videotapes, and those who are employed as canal watchmen and 
private guards.  
The main occupation of the majority of the workforce is in agriculture (table 13). The 
overall percentage of those in non-agricultural employment is 14%. This share is higher in 
DRY1 and COAST. Non-agricultural jobs are more frequently found as secondary jobs, 
accounting for 51%, than as main jobs.
18  
 
6.2 Determinants of Labor Allocation  
Table 14 shows non-agricultural income per household and per worker. 
Non-agricultural income per household was highest in COAST, followed by DRY1, DRY2, and 
HILL1. In COAST, self-employment in transportation was the most important non-agricultural 
                                                  
18 The high percentage in DELTA1 and DELTA2 of those who fall in the category "self-employed in the primary 
sector" for their secondary occupation is due to the prevalence of part-time fishing in the delta, which is common   28
activity, followed by self-employment in trade. In DRY1, the most important source of 
non-agricultural income was trade, while in HILL1, it was self-employment in the secondary 
sector. 
The lower part of table 14 shows that among individuals engaged in non-agricultural 
activities, the self-employed in rice milling and transportation had the highest income per 
worker, followed by regularly-hired employees and the self-employed in trade. A comparison 
of tables 13 and 14 shows that villages with higher non-agricultural self-employment income 
per household are those with more villagers engaged in these categories of lucrative 
non-agricultural jobs. What then determines the likelihood of an individual to be engaged in 
these categories?  
It has been observed that in many other developing countries individuals working in 
lucrative and stable non-agricultural jobs have received more education.
19 This general pattern 
can also be observed in our sample, as shown in table 15 which gives the distribution by 
completed years of education of those working in the non-agricultural sector. Those engaged in 
non-agricultural activities were more educated than those engaged in farming activities. Among 
the individuals engaged in non-agricultural activities, the regularly-hired employees were the 
most educated, followed by those self-employed in rice milling.  
To examine the determinants of whether an individual was likely to be engaged in 
attractive non-agricultural activities, we estimated a probit model that takes into account both 
individual human capital and regional differences in the availability of non-agricultural 
working opportunities. 
The explanatory variables include village fixed effects and individual characteristics 
(age, sex, and schooling). We tried two specifications regarding the choice of the dependent 
                                                                                                                                                             
but not very lucrative. 
19 See Kurosaki (2001) for the literature on various developing countries and the case of rural Pakistan.   29
variable. The first model analyzes the probability of an individual to be self-employed in rice 
milling or transportation, or employed regularly, either as a primary or secondary occupation; in 
the second model, self-employed traders are added to the group of individuals working in 
attractive non-agricultural jobs.  
Table 16 shows the regression results when all individuals aged 15 or older are 
included. The effect of education is positive and statistically significant. The effect of age has 
an inverted-U shape. Females are disadvantaged in obtaining attractive jobs. All of these effects 
of individual human capital are statistically significant. 
Of the village dummies, COAST has a significantly positive coefficient in both models. 
In the first model, DELTA2 has a significantly negative coefficient, and in the second model, 
DRY1 has a significantly positive coefficient.  
 
6.3 Regional Disparity in Non-Agricultural Income 
As the probit analysis has shown, there are fewer non-agricultural, lucrative jobs 
available in the five villages politically in the "center" (from DELTA1 to DRY3) than in the 
other three villages that are politically at the "periphery" (HILL1, HILL2, and COAST). This 
finding is another aspect of the first paradox, which was discussed in section 4. The exception 
to this paradox is DRY1, which is in the "center" and where there is an active non-agricultural 
sector. As discussed in section 5, DRY1 is an exceptional village in the "center" and in the 
major paddy-producing regions; here, the overall income level is high thanks to a high crop 
income, which can be attributed to the weaker enforcement of the paddy output maximization 
policy. 
The probit results thus indicate that in areas strongly affected by the paddy output 
maximization policy, opportunities for promising non-agricultural activities are limited. This   30
may be attributable to the lack of rural demand for non-agricultural goods and services resulting 
from low farm incomes and the dearth of industrial linkages for agro-based manufacturing and 




This paper investigated the behavior and welfare of rural households in Myanmar under 
transition from a planned to a market economy, using cross-section data obtained from a 
household survey conducted in 2001 covering more than 500 households in eight villages with 
diverse agro-ecological environments. There are two major findings. First, the income level 
was higher in villages far from the center than in villages located in regions that are tightly 
controlled by the central authorities. Second, farmers and villages that emphasized a 
paddy-based, irrigated cropping system had lower farming incomes than those that did not. 
Since in most developing countries, living conditions are typically higher in the central, 
politically dominant regions, and irrigation development usually leads to higher farm incomes 
through increased land productivity, the situation in Myanmar may seem paradoxical. Garcia et 
al. (2000) already noted that average income was lower in the irrigated villages with newly 
adopted, high-cost irrigated paddy farming. This paper showed that even after the initial, 
unstable stage of the adoption of the new technology, this situation persisted. 
The paradoxical situation is most clearly shown by the contrast between the villages 
experiencing the transformation from a single- to a double-paddy cropping system on the one 
hand, and a village in the periphery, close to the national boundary where non-agricultural job 
opportunities were flourishing, on the other. Considering rural demand and industrial linkages, 
the limited availability of non-agricultural activities in the first group of villages can be   31
attributed to weak demand due to low farm incomes. We have shown that in all the villages 
where paddy crops were grown, the crop income per acre was lower for farmers who allocated 
more land to paddy crops than for farmers who did not. Therefore, the policy to increase the 
acreage under paddy seems responsible for the paradoxical situation. 
However, for such an increase in paddy-acreage to reduce farm incomes, two 
conditions must be fulfilled: the income per acre must be lower for paddy than for other crops, 
and the government must have the wherewithal to force farmers to plant paddy rather than other 
crops. But these were exactly the conditions created by the agricultural policies which restricted 
land use by farmers and marketing by traders. Because of the distortions created by these 
policies, the transition to a market economy in Myanmar since the late 1980s has only been a 
partial one. While initially, this partial transition led to an increase in output and income from 
agriculture, its limit was revealed in the survey period. As a result, there still is vast room for an 
expansion of agricultural output and rural income, even without any innovation in technology 
or further investment in irrigation. All that would be necessary to tap this potential is to give 
farmers more freedom in land use and liberalize paddy/rice marketing.
20  
This leaves the question why regional and inter-household disparity persist. This is a 
task that remains for further investigations, requiring a rigorous analysis of the political 
economy mechanisms underlying the paddy output maximization policy. The formation of 
physical and human capital was treated as exogenous in this paper but it is important to 
endogenize it to understand the dynamics of the non-agricultural sector of the economy and 
their relationship with agricultural development. These issues are left for further research.  
 
                                                  
20 In April 2003, the government of Myanmar announced the abolishment of the paddy procurement system and 
the state monopoly of rice export, beginning from the harvest of 2003/04. What impact of this reform will have, 
remains to be seen. At the time of writing, however, there are a number of uncertainties regarding the exact design 
of the reform. For example, private exports were temporarily banned in early 2004.   32
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Output (10 million t)Table 1: Myanmar's Economy and Agriculture
1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01
Growth rate of real GDP 2.9 2.8 6.9 6.4 5.7 5.8 10.9 13.6
Growth rate of agricultural sector 2.2 2.0 5.5 3.8 3.0 3.5 10.5 9.5
Agricultural sector's share in GDP 39.7 38.7 37.1 36.2 35.2 34.5 34.4 33.1
Agricultural sector's share in export 42.4 31.8 46.0 36.1 30.3 28.0 17.9 18.9
Agricultural sector's share in workforce 64.1 63.4 62.7
Total irrigated area (million ha) 3.0 2.9 4.6 5.1 6.0
Share of irrigated area under paddy (%) 70.1 74.8 82.3 76.6 76.5
Note: "Agricultural sector" in this table does not include livestock, fishery, and forestry.
Source: CSO (2002).Table 2: Survey Villages
Name in the paper State/Division Township Village tract Topology Irrigation Major crops
DELTA1 Ayeyarwady Div Myaungmya Kyonethout Deltaic agric. Pump Paddy
DELTA2 Bago Div Waw Acarick Deltaic agric. Rainfed+Canal Paddy, pulses
DRY1 Mandalay Div Kyaukse Pyiban Dry zone Canal Paddy, vegetables
DRY2 Magway Div Magway Kanpyar Dry zone Rainfed Upland crops
DRY3 Magway Div Taungdwingyi Wetkathay Dry zone Rainfed+Tank Upland crops, paddy
HILL1 Shan State Nyaungshwe Linkin Hilly region Rainfed Vegetables, paddy, sugarcane
HILL2 Shan State Kalaw Myinmahti Hilly region Rainfed Vegetables, paddy
COAST Tanintharyi Div Myeik Engamaw Coastal agric. Rainfed Paddy, rubber
Source: Authors' survey (ibid. for the tables below).Table 3: Sample Households
With farmland Agric. labor Non-agric. Sub-total
DELTA1 232 283 515 67 1 17 15 33 100
DELTA2 213 243 456 60 0 30 10 40 100
DRY1 118 101 219 65 6 18 13 37 102
DRY2 326 336 662 24 0 12 4 16 40
DRY3 334 176 510 24 2 12 2 16 40
HILL1 544 298 842 26 0 9 3 12 38
HILL2 422 75 497 34 0 2 4 6 40
COAST 647 520 1167 41 5 7 8 20 61
Total 2836 2032 4868 341 14 107 59 180 521
Village
Total number of households Number of sample households
"Farm"
"Non-Farm"






DELTA1 5.1 2.5 42.5 3.0 57.0 40.0 4.2
DELTA2 5.6 2.6 43.6 0.0 36.0 64.0 4.1
DRY1 4.7 2.2 42.5 0.0 18.6 81.4 5.1
DRY2 5.3 3.1 47.6 2.5 22.5 75.0 4.6
DRY3 5.7 2.9 47.6 5.0 7.5 87.5 4.8
HILL1 6.0 3.3 49.2 21.1 44.7 34.2 3.2
HILL2 5.6 2.9 45.0 2.5 17.5 80.0 4.6
COAST 6.7 2.9 51.1 0.0 36.1 63.9 5.4
By household type
Farm 5.6 2.8 48.0 2.9 32.8 64.2 4.9
Non-farm, with farmland 5.1 1.9 36.9 0.0 64.0 85.7 3.5
Non-farm, agric. labor 5.2 2.5 38.8 4.7 32.7 62.6 3.9
Non-farm, non-agric. 5.3 2.3 42.3 0.0 35.6 64.4 4.9



































DELTA1 5.97 1.17 0.28 0.78 16.9 0.63 0.21 0.46 0.12 0.22 200.4
DELTA2 7.17 2.88 0.90 1.02 14.2 1.14 0.05 0.06 0.60 0.21 242.4
DRY1 3.32 0.71 0.25 0.67 4.9 0.42 0.05 0.13 0.32 1.08 216.6
DRY2 6.13 1.50 0.15 0.30 3.2 0.80 0.00 0.00 1.18 0.50 244.0
DRY3 6.06 1.75 1.15 0.78 8.8 1.13 0.00 0.03 0.65 0.55 170.1
HILL1 7.06 0.53 0.00 0.03 2.9 0.55 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.87 205.7
HILL2 3.92 1.40 0.05 0.63 0.1 1.20 0.00 0.03 0.50 0.25 160.1
COAST 5.81 1.46 0.25 0.62 15.6 0.72 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.15 549.1
By household type
Farm 8.56 2.15 0.37 0.76 11.3 1.19 0.11 0.20 0.62 0.60 183.3
Non-farm, with farmland 0.14 0.29 0.50 0.57 1.2 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.29 60.3
Non-farm, agric. labor 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.20 2.8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.5
Non-farm, non-agric. 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.81 12.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 322.2
Total 5.62 1.43 0.27 0.64 9.5 0.79 0.07 0.13 0.41 0.47 243.0
Note:


























DELTA1 134,535 (112,106) 30,065 (27,467) 32,598 19,751 31,375
DELTA2 155,423 (109,022) 29,745 (20,610) 30,002 26,828 36,948
DRY1 209,661 (196,239) 49,378 (54,493) 55,027 22,061 65,903
DRY2 216,482 (272,223) 43,975 (55,297) 60,343 17,390 25,518
DRY3 87,591 (76,341) 17,084 (15,632) 18,421 15,795 19,050
HILL1 194,807 (145,299) 36,447 (27,269) 40,634 29,742 20,280
HILL2 169,477 (140,675) 32,147 (25,250) 32,331 9,198 42,058
COAST 314,478 (583,405) 44,547 (58,844) 44,067 30,953 65,847
By household type
Farm 207,981 (284,776) 39,337 (40,424)
Non-farm, with farmland 140,238 (115,305) 28,772 (18,311)
Non-farm, agric. labor 108,282 (73,120) 22,791 (13,103)
Non-farm, non-agric. 193,861 (266,087) 43,947 (65,402)
Total 184,086 (252,911) 36,177 (40,506)
Total household
income (Kyats)
Income per capita (Kyats/person)








DELTA1 0.338 0.269 0.398 0.508
DELTA2 0.237 0.186 0.335 0.294
DRY1 0.374 0.330 0.440 0.326
DRY2 0.659 0.551 0.563 0.539
DRY3 0.278 0.266 0.395 0.677
HILL1 0.269 0.245 0.389 0.411
HILL2 0.271 0.265 0.388 0.475
COAST 0.501 0.678 0.535 0.371
By household type
Farm 0.434 0.419 0.461 0.391
Non-farm, with farmland 0.363 0.288 0.408 0.386
Non-farm, agric. labor 0.177 0.181 0.326 0.516
Non-farm, non-agric. 0.346 0.445 0.448 0.448
Total 0.402 0.421 0.460 0.421








































DELTA1 82,771 16,896 3,055 31,813 -5,089 61.5 12.6 2.3 23.6 100.0
DELTA2 89,069 21,754 16,641 27,959 -2,757 57.3 14.0 10.7 18.0 100.0
DRY1 128,434 23,179 1,775 56,274 -6,604 61.3 11.1 0.8 26.8 100.0
DRY2 149,335 22,618 0 44,529 400 69.0 10.4 0.0 20.6 100.0
DRY3 53,027 22,655 2,983 8,927 -7,761 60.5 25.9 3.4 10.2 100.0
HILL1 105,061 44,209 0 45,536 -5,667 53.9 22.7 0.0 23.4 100.0
HILL2 118,969 19,770 0 30,739 -3,271 70.2 11.7 0.0 18.1 100.0
COAST 106,330 27,145 3,502 177,502 -1,280 33.8 8.6 1.1 56.4 100.0
By household type 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Farm 153,094 10,437 299 44,152 -5,891 73.6 5.0 0.1 21.2 100.0
Non-farm, with farmland 32,344 29,980 0 77,914 -2,772 23.1 21.4 0.0 55.6 100.0
Non-farm, agric. labor 802 67,560 20,860 19,061 660 0.7 62.4 19.3 17.6 100.0
Non-farm, non-agric. 14,787 16,258 2,533 160,283 -3,385 7.6 8.4 1.3 82.7 100.0
Total 102,910 23,353 4,767 53,057 -4,178 55.9 12.7 2.6 28.8 100.0




















DELTA1 67 8.93 0.04 8.97 15.08 1.73 99.5 42.3 57.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
DELTA2 60 11.99 0.12 12.10 17.14 1.44 74.0 8.6 65.4 25.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1
DRY1 71 4.38 1.00 5.38 8.75 1.64 62.5 22.5 40.0 1.8 16.2 17.4 0.8 1.3
DRY2 24 0.00 10.45 10.45 21.42 2.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.6 46.7 0.2 0.0 17.4
DRY3 26 6.09 3.43 9.51 12.27 1.30 45.6 1.1 44.5 15.9 30.9 2.6 0.2 4.7
HILL1 26 1.42 9.01 10.44 9.18 1.10 15.4 11.4 4.0 9.7 12.2 6.4 22.3 34.1
HILL2 32 1.01 3.53 4.53 5.24 1.41 32.1 0.0 32.1 6.9 9.4 50.6 0.0 1.0
COAST 44 4.21 4.00 8.21 7.77 0.94 51.7 1.0 50.7 0.3 0.0 2.4 33.6 12.0
# Only those households with positive crop acreage during the survey year are included.
































DELTA1 100,607 (92,437) 11,222 10,574 96.3 47.3 49.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 3.0
DELTA2 156,839 (106,751) 12,958 9,152 60.8 3.9 56.9 38.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2
DRY1 179,207 (182,317) 33,305 20,489 35.3 15.4 19.9 1.5 0.9 57.0 0.3 5.1
DRY2 268,764 (337,769) 25,718 12,547 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6 84.2 0.0 0.0 11.3
DRY3 91,162 (94,754) 9,582 7,431 21.1 0.6 20.4 16.3 42.7 18.0 0.1 1.9
HILL1 137,780 (123,029) 13,200 15,017 6.4 5.1 1.3 4.2 2.5 28.3 43.9 14.7
HILL2 150,979 (141,289) 33,313 28,820 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 8.8 3.4 87.1 0.0 1.0
COAST 117,067 (120,947) 14,256 15,069 46.0 1.4 44.6 1.3 0.0 13.8 31.0 7.8




of crop group i
 (Name of crop
group i)
DELTA2 -0.443 0.448 (Pulses)
DRY1 -0.385 0.555 (Vegetables)
DRY2 n.a. 0.599 (Other crops)
DRY3 -0.529 0.349 (Oilseed crops)
HILL1 -0.094 0.319 (Industrial crops)
HILL2 -0.364 0.308 (Vegetables)
COAST -0.473 0.810 (Vegetables)
Note: This table reports bivariate correlation coefficients at the
household level between per-acre crop income and crop acreage shares.
With the exception of the coefficient on HILL1 (-0.094), all coefficients
are statistically significant at 5%. See Table 9 for the number of
observations.Table 12: Production Cost Structure and Profitability of Major Crops


















(1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5)=(3)-(4) (6) (7)=(5)-(6)
A. Paddy in major paddy-producing regions
DELTA1 Monsoon 67 8.62 17,615 4,736 12,880 5,754 7,125 6,100 666 293 992 2,269
Summer 66 6.47 27,526 13,765 13,762 4,739 9,023 8,933 90 2,578 5,017 90
DELTA2 Monsoon 36 9.37 18,071 2,956 15,116 5,753 9,363 6,166 3,197 61 637 4,193
Late monsoon 8 8.17 17,156 2,892 14,264 5,074 9,190 4,454 4,735 524 1,009 6,392
Summer 13 3.12 16,603 3,067 13,537 3,181 10,355 6,965 3,390 627 380 3,390
DRY1 Monsoon 33 4.06 29,171 10,273 18,898 9,468 9,430 2,396 7,034 271 2,488 9,761
Summer 25 2.72 42,093 12,686 29,408 13,043 16,365 3,628 12,737 145 3,471 13,044
B. Paddy in other regions
DRY3 Total paddy 13 5.16 11,865 3,003 8,862 3,136 5,726 3,562 2,164 0 162 2,296
HILL1 Total paddy 9 2.43 31,238 12,001 19,237 13,366 5,870 7,711 -1,840 365 1,906 548
HILL2 Monsoon (paddy field) 7 1.37 27,061 13,600 13,461 11,141 2,320 8,783 -6,463 0 0 -5,142
Monsoon (upland field) 9 1.97 16,829 11,117 5,713 5,507 205 6,984 -6,778 0 0 -6,222
COAST Monsoon 27 4.30 24,842 4,353 20,489 7,479 13,010 14,896 -1,887 34 1,099 1,379
C. Non-paddy crops
Pulses DELTA2 Black gram 15 5.58 30,648 5,467 25,181 3,598 21,583 7,047 14,536 165 344 14,693
DELTA2 Green gram 14 3.73 20,630 4,630 16,000 2,128 13,872 6,803 7,069 0 148 8,397
DRY2 Green gram 8 4.13 12,052 4,657 7,395 4,822 2,573 1,961 612 0 157 612
Oilseed crops DRY1 Sesamum 15 4.18 6,468 1,457 5,011 3,205 1,805 2,075 -270 0 167 -270
DRY3 Sesamum 13 5.49 32,563 9,489 23,074 5,071 18,003 2,833 15,170 0 0 15,170
DRY2 Groundnut 9 1.91 56,881 12,963 43,919 2,657 41,262 9,038 32,224 0 0 32,224
Vegetables DRY1 Chili 15 1.63 170,141 15,640 154,500 15,384 139,116 7,310 131,806 2,243 4,061 131,806
DRY3 Potato 5 0.54 118,000 34,810 83,190 5,194 77,996 8,460 69,536 0 200 69,536
HILL1 Potato 5 0.44 502,420 213,635 288,785 21,028 267,757 216,272 51,486 630 11,110 51,486
HILL2 Potato 5 0.98 174,245 90,651 83,595 29,761 53,834 11,850 41,984 0 1,800 41,984
HILL2 Cabbage 6 1.11 105,619 31,554 74,065 12,365 61,700 10,937 50,763 0 0 50,763
HILL2 Cauliflower 6 1.01 101,638 32,988 68,649 5,917 62,732 10,159 52,573 0 0 52,573
Industrial crops HILL1 Sugarcane 11 3.92 58,588 14,529 44,059 11,173 32,886 11,104 21,782 2,108 1,361 24,599
COAST Rubber 11 8.62 20,536 1,252 19,284 4,774 14,510 12,632 1,877 0 235 1,877
Notes: (1) Imputed factor costs include the input value of family labor, owned animals, and owned machinery, evaluated at the median village rental rates,
   but do not include the value of land and the interests on working capital owned by the household.
(2) Paid factor costs include interests paid for the working capital.












































DELTA1 63.5 3.1 22.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 5.1 1.2 1.6 0.8 0.0 11.5 255
DELTA2 59.7 9.7 19.4 3.0 0.0 1.8 3.7 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.1 11.1 268
DRY1 57.6 2.1 23.7 0.0 0.0 0.8 9.3 1.7 0.4 2.5 1.7 16.4 236
DRY2 54.8 0.0 31.5 0.0 0.0 1.6 2.4 0.8 0.8 4.8 3.2 13.6 124
DRY3 66.4 1.6 25.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.8 6.7 119
HILL1 70.3 0.0 24.2 2.3 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.0 5.5 128
HILL2 85.3 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.9 5.3 116
COAST 52.5 3.3 9.3 1.6 2.2 6.0 8.7 6.0 3.8 6.0 0.5 34.8 183
Total 62.3 3.1 20.6 1.0 0.3 2.0 4.8 1.4 1.0 2.3 1.0 13.8 1429
Secondary occupation (if any)
DELTA1 9.0 0.8 35.2 32.0 0.8 5.7 7.4 3.3 3.3 0.0 2.5 55.0 122
DELTA2 0.0 1.1 47.7 19.3 0.0 9.1 15.9 1.1 2.3 0.0 3.4 51.1 88
DRY1 7.6 0.0 40.5 1.3 1.3 7.6 26.6 2.5 6.3 0.0 6.3 51.9 79
DRY2 7.4 0.0 35.2 1.9 0.0 14.8 1.9 1.9 31.5 0.0 5.6 57.6 54
DRY3 2.3 2.3 59.1 4.5 0.0 9.1 0.0 2.3 13.6 2.3 4.5 36.3 44
HILL1 11.3 0.0 47.9 9.9 5.6 18.3 4.2 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.8 71
HILL2 2.4 0.0 56.1 4.8 2.4 14.6 7.3 4.9 2.4 0.0 4.9 41.3 41
COAST 11.5 0.0 23.0 1.6 8.2 16.4 18.0 3.3 6.6 0.0 11.5 65.6 61
Total 6.8 0.5 41.6 12.5 2.1 11.1 11.1 2.7 7.0 0.2 4.5 51.2 560




























DELTA1 6,875 600 6,555 10,301 3,628 2,475 1,180 200 31,813
DELTA2 7,785 0 4,227 11,938 910 710 0 2,389 27,959
DRY1 196 980 2,276 33,926 5,139 4,310 4,736 4,757 56,274
DRY2 85 0 9,403 3,363 6,068 12,109 4,440 9,062 44,529
DRY3 900 0 588 3,143 672 1,266 1,080 1,279 8,927
HILL1 6,000 14,753 16,905 958 2,790 2,426 1,705 0 45,537
HILL2 2,020 0 13,936 4,985 1,613 1,688 1,560 4,938 30,739
COAST 4,708 31,985 25,760 21,615 57,109 13,483 8,804 11,128 174,592
Total 4,072 5,128 8,601 14,393 9,408 4,367 2,852 3,904 52,717
Per-worker average
DELTA1 17,186 60,000 40,968 46,823 45,350 24,750 118,000 4,000 30,887
DELTA2 21,626 0 30,193 47,750 45,500 8,875 0 34,129 30,390
DRY1 20,002 100,001 25,789 78,647 87,358 73,277 80,504 48,525 69,156
DRY2 3,400 0 37,610 33,625 80,912 25,492 59,200 51,780 37,897
DRY3 18,000 0 5,875 31,425 26,880 6,332 14,400 51,152 15,525
HILL1 22,800 112,120 37,787 9,100 35,334 92,199 64,801 0 42,205
HILL2 40,400 0 55,745 39,880 16,125 67,500 62,400 65,833 45,539
COAST 71,804 216,787 56,120 52,740 267,974 51,403 59,672 61,708 92,610
Total 22,098 157,158 41,491 56,382 122,543 32,975 61,920 46,228 51,724
Self-employed Employees




















A. Number of workers:
By main occupation
No formal education (0 year) 6051 13 234 3 4
Primary (1-4 years) 6 1 14 39 5 8 5 6 84
Secondary (5-8 years) 2391 39 271 4 6
Higher secondary (9-10 years) 0 1 2 4 3 3 8 2 23
College and above (11+) 0 0 0 2 0 0 10 1 13
Total 14 5 30 69 20 15 33 14 200
By secondary occupation (if any)
No formal education (0 year) 33 3 14 12 6 13 0 4 85
Primary (1-4 years) 30 3 28 36 5 18 1 13 134
Secondary (5-8 years) 7 4 18 10 4 4 0 4 51
Higher secondary (9-10 years) 0 2 1 3 0 4 0 4 14
College and above (11+) 0 0 1 1 0 0002
Total 70 12 62 62 15 39 1 25 286
B. Average schooling years 2.07 5.29 4.11 3.89 4.11 3.44 7.56 4.15 3.87
(8) Others Total
Self-employed EmployeesTable 16: Determinants of Having an Attractive Non-Agricultural Job
Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat
Intercept -2.560 -6.04 ** -3.148 -9.56 **
Village dummies
DELTA2 -0.559 -2.28 * -0.022 -0.15
DRY1 -0.137 -0.68 0.325 2.38 *
DRY2 0.112 0.49 -0.101 -0.55
DRY3 -0.162 -0.63 -0.248 -1.24
HILL1 0.243 1.09 0.009 0.05
HILL2 0.045 0.19 -0.095 -0.50
COAST 0.431 2.32 * 0.487 3.38 **
Individual attributes
Age 0.071 3.59 ** 0.099 6.63 **
Age-squared/100 -0.082 -3.30 ** -0.116 -6.21 **
Sex (male=1, female=2) -0.567 -4.87 ** -0.083 -1.04
Schooling years 0.077 4.50 ** 0.033 2.40 *
Number of observations 1890 1890
Likelihood ratio test statistics for zero slope 99.0 ** 105.2 **
Log likelihood -312.3 -617.0
Pseudo R-squared 0.137 0.079
Notes: (1) Estimated by a probit model using maximum likelihood estimation.
(2) Statistically significant at 1% (**) and 5% (*).
Probability of an individual to be self-
employed in rice milling or in
transportation, or employed regularly
Probability of an individual to be self-
employed in rice milling, in trade, or in
transportation, or employed regularlyAppendix Table: Production Cost Structure and Profitability of Major Crops
MP total small large SP total small large MP total small large Late MP SP MP total small large SP total small large
Number of observations 67 34 33 66 35 31 36 18 18 8 13 33 17 16 25 13 12
Area under the crop (acres) 8.62 4.37 12.99 6.47 3.13 10.24 9.37 5.43 13.30 8.17 3.12 4.06 1.83 6.43 2.72 1.54 4.01
Output value per acre 17615 17697 17531 27526 26203 29020 18071 20779 15363 17156 16603 29171 27926 30493 42093 46244 37597
Current input per acre 4736 4537 4940 13765 12716 14948 2956 3381 2530 2892 3067 10273 9169 11446 12686 13403 11908
Seed (1558) (1576) (1541) (2375) (2368) (2382) (1224) (1270) (1179) (1376) (1126) (2827) (2932) (2716) (2806) (2946) (2654)
Farm yard manure (144) (127) (161) (39) (34) (44) (741) (879) (603) (385) (385) (528) (272) (801) (327) (287) (371)
Fertilizer (2702) (2528) (2882) (8599) (7558) (9774) (805) (992) (619) (534) (867) (6405) (5551) (7313) (8813) (9343) (8238)
Other chemicals (39) (33) (45) (174) (185) (161) (125) (195) (55) (73) (62) (240) (217) (266) (594) (751) (424)
Diesel oil (293) (274) (312) (2578) (2571) (2587) (61) (46) (75) (524) (627) (271) (197) (350) (145) (77) (220)
Value added per acre 12880 13160 12591 13762 13487 14072 15116 17398 12833 14264 13537 18898 18757 19047 29408 32841 25689
Paid factor costs per acre 5754 5062 6467 4739 4199 5348 5753 5880 5626 5074 3181 9468 10826 8025 13043 15891 9958
Daily hired labor (4094) (3665) (4535) (1928) (1670) (2218) (2873) (3657) (2089) (2913) (1814) (4874) (4896) (4851) (6875) (8146) (5498)
Seasonally hired labor (929) (674) (1191) (953) (525) (1436) (2533) (1904) (3162) (1240) (1164) (197) (0) (407) (12) (0) (24)
Hired animals (62) (122) (0) (66) (122) (3) (16) (0) (32) (213) (0) (2129) (3172) (1020) (2101) (3608) (467)
Hired machinery (255) (297) (211) (1329) (1638) (979) (141) (200) (83) (633) (192) (2258) (2740) (1746) (3290) (3005) (3598)
Actual payment of interest (416) (305) (530) (464) (244) (712) (190) (119) (260) (76) (11) (10) (19) (0) (766) (1131) (370)
Income per acre 7125 8098 6123 9023 9288 8723 9363 11519 7207 9190 10355 9430 7931 11022 16365 16950 15731
Imputed factor costs per acre 6100 6932 5243 8933 9028 8825 6166 6806 5526 4454 6965 2396 2621 2157 3628 3624 3632
Family labor (2861) (3684) (2013) (3519) (4563) (2341) (2080) (2334) (1826) (1222) (2973) (865) (1048) (672) (1292) (1839) (699)
Own animals (2502) (2764) (2231) (1725) (2042) (1367) (3591) (3900) (3281) (2856) (3804) (1301) (1573) (1012) (2155) (1621) (2734)
Own machinery (738) (484) (999) (3688) (2422) (5117) (496) (572) (419) (377) (188) (230) (0) (474) (181) (164) (200)
Profit per acre 666 246 1098 90 259 -101 3197 4712 1681 4735 3390 7034 5310 8865 12737 13326 12099
All output at market price
Value added per acre 14483 14729 14229 13762 13487 14072 16112 18650 13575 15920 13537 21625 21378 21889 29715 33432 25689
Income per acre 8728 9667 7762 9023 9288 8723 10360 12770 7949 10846 10355 12157 10551 13864 16672 17541 15731
Profit per acre 2269 1816 2736 90 259 -101 4193 5964 2423 6392 3390 9761 7930 11707 13044 13917 12099
Notes: (1) Figures in parentheses represent the break-down of the first row in the row group without parentheses
(2) When the number of observations is larger than 20, observations are divided into "small" (<=median) and "large" (>median) by the size of the area under the crop.
(3) "MP" indicates Monsoon Paddy and "SP" indicates Summer Paddy.
A. Paddy in Major Paddy-Producing Regions












MP total small large
Number of observations 13 9 7 9 27 14 13
Area under the crop (acres) 5.16 2.43 1.37 1.97 4.30 2.37 6.38
Output value per acre 11865 31238 27061 16829 24842 26725 22814
Current input per acre 3003 12001 13600 11117 4353 4627 4057
Seed (1407) (2009) (1641) (707) (1327) (1473) (1169)
Farm yard manure (891) (1186) (5366) (4202) (692) (391) (1016)
Fertilizer (640) (5923) (6172) (5759) (1856) (2134) (1557)
Other chemicals (65) (2519) (421) (449) (444) (629) (244)
Diesel oil (0) (365) (0) (0) (34) (0) (71)
Value added per acre 8862 19237 13461 5713 20489 22098 18756
Paid factor costs per acre 3136 13366 11141 5507 7479 8819 6036
Daily hired labor (1813) (10194) (5359) (3240) (3019) (3772) (2209)
Seasonally hired labor (250) (0) (0) (0) (2828) (2892) (2758)
Hired animals (649) (1955) (5434) (964) (466) (627) (292)
Hired machinery (162) (776) (0) (0) (1005) (1399) (579)
Actual payment of interest (264) (441) (348) (1304) (162) (129) (198)
Income per acre 5726 5870 2320 205 13010 13278 12721
Imputed factor costs per acre 3562 7711 8783 6984 14896 14285 15555
Family labor (1044) (5201) (6371) (5026) (8814) (8341) (9324)
Own animals (2517) (1380) (2412) (1957) (5988) (5944) (6036)
Own machinery (0) (1130) (0) (0) (94) (0) (195)
Profit per acre 2164 -1840 -6463 -6778 -1887 -1007 -2834
All output at market price
Value added per acre 8994 21625 14783 6269 23755 25132 22272
Income per acre 5858 8259 3641 762 16276 16312 16236
Profit per acre 2296 548 -5142 -6222 1379 2027 681
HILL2 COAST








Village DELTA2 DRY2 DELTA2 DRY1 DRY2 DRY3 DRY1 HILL1 HILL2 DRY3 HILL2 HILL2 HILL1 COAST
Number of observations 15 8 14 15 13 9 15 55566 1 1 1 1
Area under the crop (acres) 5.58 4.13 3.73 4.18 5.49 1.91 1.63 0.44 0.98 0.54 1.11 1.01 3.92 8.62
Output value per acre 30648 12052 20630 6468 32563 56881 170141 502420 174245 118000 105619 101638 58588 20536
Current input per acre 5467 4657 4630 1457 9489 12963 15640 213635 90651 34810 31554 32988 14529 1252
Seed (4660) (1798) (3676) (888) (2019) (8795) (1751) (121900) (16368) (13300) (7804) (19136) (5279) (0)
Farm yard manure (67) (0) (72) (287) (2093) (1284) (1532) (13402) (33483) (7185) (12200) (5040) (1038) (0)
Fertilizer (159) (1808) (357) (282) (4185) (1338) (9017) (22480) (12330) (10825) (7687) (5899) (6103) (0)
Other chemicals (417) (1051) (525) (0) (1193) (1546) (1096) (55223) (28469) (3500) (3864) (2913) (0) (1252)
Diesel oil (165) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (2243) (630) (0) (0) (0) (0) (2108) (0)
Value added per acre 25181 7395 16000 5011 23074 43919 154500 288785 83595 83190 74065 68649 44059 19284
Paid factor costs per acre 3598 4822 2128 3205 5071 2657 15384 21028 29761 5194 12365 5917 11173 4774
Daily hired labor (1390) (3991) (956) (1053) (3597) (2657) (8802) (11304) (19647) (4354) (6190) (2374) (5945) (2212)
Seasonally hired labor (2160) (0) (978) (313) (136) (0) (1257) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (2405)
Hired animals (0) (332) (0) (1673) (505) (0) (2176) (225) (4158) (640) (2808) (1989) (2399) (0)
Hired machinery (48) (157) (148) (167) (0) (0) (3149) (9030) (1800) (200) (0) (0) (906) (158)
Actual payment of interest (0) (342) (46) (0) (833) (0) (0) (469) (4156) (0) (3367) (1553) (1923) (0)
Income per acre 21583 2573 13872 1805 18003 41262 139116 267757 53834 77996 61700 62732 32886 14510
Imputed factor costs per acre 7047 1961 6803 2075 2833 9038 7310 216272 11850 8460 10937 10159 11104 12632
Family labor (2606) (844) (2912) (454) (1039) (3010) (4155) (213952) (7910) (3120) (8131) (9537) (9778) (12555)
Own animals (4144) (1116) (3891) (1622) (1794) (6028) (2243) (240) (3940) (5340) (2806) (622) (871) (0)
Own machinery (296) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (912) (2080) (0) (0) (0) (0) (455) (77)
Profit per acre 14536 612 7069 -270 15170 32224 131806 51486 41984 69536 50763 52573 21782 1877
All output at market price
Value added per acre 25338 7395 17328 5011 23074 43919 154500 288785 83595 83190 74065 68649 46876 19284
Income per acre 21740 2573 15200 1805 18003 41262 139116 267757 53834 77996 61700 62732 35703 14510
Profit per acre 14693 612 8397 -270 15170 32224 131806 51486 41984 69536 50763 52573 24599 1877
Green gram
Oilseed crop
Sesame
Vegetables
Potato
Pulses Industrial crops
C. Non-paddy crops